We study the possibility of constructing encryption schemes secure under messages that are chosen depending on the key k of the encryption scheme itself. We give the following separation results that hold both in the private and in the public key settings:
Introduction
A cryptographic primitive is key-dependent input secure, or KDI-secure for short, if it remains secure also in case where the input depends on the secret key. In the case of encryption schemes, KDI-security means that the adversary can obtain, in addition to the usual queries, encryptions of h(k), where k is the key of the scheme and h is chosen by the adversary from some (hopefully large) family of functions H.
On a first look it might seem that by using the right design it is possible to prevent any "KDI-attacks" on the encryption scheme, and thus achieving such strong security would be only of pure theoretical interest. It turns out, however, that such attacks might "naturally" arise when considering complex systems. For instance, in the BitLocker disk encryption utility (used in Windows Vista), the disk encryption key can end up being stored on the disk and thus encrypted along with the disk contents. For more details on the importance of KDI-security, see [BHHO08] and references within.
In this work we study the possibility of obtaining such an encryption scheme both from one-way functions and from other hardness assumptions. In particular, we exclude different types of reductions from a KDIsecure encryption scheme to different hardness assumption. Intuitively, a black-box reduction of a primitive P to a primitive Q is a construction of P out of Q that ignores the internal structure of the implementation of Q and just uses it as a "subroutine" (i.e., as a black box). The reduction is fully-black-box (following [RTV04] ) if the proof of security (showing that an adversary that breaks the implementation of P implies an adversary that breaks the implementation of Q) is also black-box (i.e., the internal structure of the adversary that breaks the implementation of P is ignored as well).
Our first result shows that there is no fully-black-box reduction from KDI-secure encryption schemes to one-way permutations, even if the KDI-security is only against the relatively small class of poly(n)-wise independent hash-functions. When considering reduction from a KDI-secure encryption scheme, it is
Contributions of this Paper
In this paper we give two impossibility results for security proofs of constructions of KDI-secure private-key encryption schemes. However, since every public-key encryption scheme can be also viewed as a private-key scheme (i.e., both parties use the same private/public key), our impossibility results immediately extend to the public-key case. Our first result is a black-box separation of KDI encryption scheme from one-way permutations and from (even enhanced) family of trapdoor permutations. Theorem 1.1. Let (Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme that is fully-black-box constructed from one-way permutations. Then there exists an efficient family H of poly(n)-wise independent hash functions such that the following holds: there exists no black-box reduction from breaking the KDI-security of (Enc, Dec) against H to inverting one-way permutations. Furthermore, the above holds also with respect to (enhanced) families of trapdoor permutations.
For our second result, we assume that the challenge function itself under which the scheme should be KDI-secure is treated by the proof of security as a black box. Moreover, the proof of security does not forward an access to the challenge function to a "third party". We call such a reduction strongly-black-box and give the following result.
Theorem 1.2 (informal).
There exists no reduction with strongly-black-box proof from the KDI-security of an encryption scheme to the security of "any cryptographic assumption".
We stress that the construction of the encryption scheme considered in Theorem 1.2 can be arbitrary. The formal statement of Theorem 1.2 is given in Section 4.
Interpretation of Our Results
So what should we think on the possibility of building KDI-secure encryption scheme given the above negative results? Let us start with Theorem 1.1 and let's first consider the fully-black-box restrictions. We remark that while quite a few black-box impossibility results of these types are known (see Section 1.1), there is not even a single known example where we have an impossibility result of the type given in Theorem 1.1, and yet a "non-black-box" reduction was found.
1 We also remark that the reductions given in [BHHO08, HK07, HU08] are fully-black-box. The second issue is that we only rule out security against poly-wise independent hash function, where the value for "poly" is determined as a function of the encryption scheme. It seems, however, that in most settings one cannot limit the power of the queries used in the KDI attack (but merely assume that these functions should be efficiently computable). Typically, when designing an encryption scheme, the exact configuration of each of the systems in which the scheme is going to be used is unknown. These configurations, however, determine the challenge functions "used" in the KDI attacks.
In Theorem 1.2 we consider arbitrary constructions, but require only black-box access to the challenge functions. This additional restriction actually reflects three separate restrictions. The first is that the proof has only input/output access to the challenge function, the second is that the challenge function cannot be assumed to be efficient, and the third is that the reduction "knows" all the queries made to the challenge functions (we force the last restriction by disallowing the reduction to give a third party an handle to the challenge function). While the first two restrictions seem to be a real limitation on the generality of our second result, the third restriction is harmless in most settings. In particular, this is the case where the hardness assumption does not accept (even implicitly) handler to functions. This list includes all the "non-interactive hardness assumptions" such as one-way functions, factoring, DDH etc. 
Our Technique
In the proof of both our results, we are using the same oracle, Breaker, that helps us to break the KDIsecurity of every encryption scheme. Let (Enc, Dec) be some fixed encryption scheme. On input (h, c), where h is some length doubling function and c is a ciphertext, Breaker considers all possible keys, and returns the first key k for which Dec(k, c) = h(k), or ⊥ if no such key exists. It is not hard to see that (Enc, Dec) is not KDI-secure, with respect to h, in the presence of Breaker. Therefore, our impossibly results follow if Breaker does not help to violate the underlying hardness assumption. For this, we need to assume that Breaker is only called with functions h that are chosen uniformly from the respective set of challenge functions. We ensure this by restricting the functions h for which Breaker performs the above computation to one that is randomly chosen (and then give the adversary access to it). Under this restriction, we manage to prove that Breaker does not help in breaking the assumption. Proving this is our main technical contribution (note that Breaker cannot be implemented efficiently) and we prove it differently in each of our separation results.
1 The superiority of non-black-box techniques was demonstrated by Barak [Bar01] in the settings of zero-knowledge arguments for NP. In these settings, however, the black-box access is to the, possibly cheating, verifier and not to any underlying primitive.
2 The only exception we could think of for a reduction that benefits from passing the handler to the challenge function to a third party, is a reduction from one KDI-secure encryption scheme B to another KDI-secure encryption scheme A. In such a reduction, the security proof of scheme B typically forwards the challenge function to the security proof of scheme A.
One-way permutations. Let π be a random permutation and let (Dec π , Enc π ) be a candidate of a KDIsecure encryption scheme given π as the one-way permutation. We find a polynomial p(n) (which depends on Dec and Enc) and use a family of length-doubling p(n)-wise independent hash-functions as the challenge functions. Imagine now that a call of A to Breaker helps A to invert π. Then, the behavior of Breaker must be very different for a large number of potential preimages of y, as otherwise the call gave roughly no information about the preimage of y. We show, however, that for all but a negligible fraction of the functions h, the behavior of Breaker will be the same for most possible preimages of y, no matter how the ciphertext is chosen.
Arbitrary assumptions. In this we use the family of all length-doubling functions as the challenge functions. The idea is that for a random h in the family, all calls to Breaker (done outside of the KDI game) are very likely to be answered with ⊥. The reason is that for a fixed k ∈ {0, 1} t , the probability that Dec(k, c) = h(k) is roughly 2 −2t . This somewhat naive intuition is actually false, as it can fail in the following way: A picks a key k itself, queries h(k ), encrypt this with k itself, and gives the resulting ciphertext to Breaker. We prove, however, that this is essentially the only way in which the above intuition fails. Thus, instead of calling Breaker, A can as well check the keys on which h was previously queried, which can be done efficiently. We conclude that if there is a reduction with strongly-black-box proof of security from a KDI encryption scheme to a given hardness assumption, then the hardness assumption is false.
Paper Organization
We present the notations and formal definitions used in this paper in Section 2. In Section 3 we give the separation from one-way permutations, and in Section 4 we give the separation from any hardness assumption. Finally, in Section 5 we consider the question whether the techniques used in this paper are also useful for proving impossibility result w.r.t. other KDI-secure cryptographic primitives.
Preliminaries

Notation
We denote the concatenation of two strings x and y by x • y. If X is a random variable taking values in a finite set U, then we write x ← U to indicate that x is selected according to the uniform distribution over U. We often use probabilities where we choose an oracle π from some uncountable set of oracles at random. To make these well defined, one has to define the uniform measure on the oracles, which can be done by mapping an oracle to a real r ∈ [0, 1) (for example by interpreting the truth table of the oracle as binary representation of r), and then using Lebesgue-measure. One can verify that with this definition indeed all random variables that occur in this paper are measurable. It is well known ( [CW79] ) that there exists an efficient family of s-wise independent hash functions frombit strings to m-bit strings for every choice of and m whose elements description size is O(s · max { , m}).
Many-wise Independence
We use the following upper bound on the probability that many s-wise independent events occur, where each event has low probability. The usual bounds seem not strong enough in our setting, as they focus on the range where the probability of a single event is constant. In our case, the probability of a single event decreases as the number of events increases, and we therefore use a different bound.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to find a small family, T , of sets of size s in U = {1, . . . , V }, such that every set in U of size α has a subset in T . In this case, one can use the union bound on the sets in T (as explained in the proof). We first find T .
Claim 2.4. There exists a family of α log(V )(
s sets of size s such that the following holds.
Proof. Directly with the probabilistic method. Pick α log(V )(
s sets of size s at random. The probability that a fixed set of size α has none of these sets as a subset is (1 − (
subsets of size α in U, the expected number of uncovered sets is smaller than 1, which implies that with positive probability we obtain a family as required.
Consider now a family T with |T |
s of sets of size s, such that every set Q ⊆ U of size α has a subset in T (as guaranteed by Claim 2.4). If
This implies that there exists a set τ ∈ T such that B i = 1 for all i ∈ τ . By the union bound, the probability that the latter happens for some subset in T is at most
Encryption Schemes and KDI Security
We define a (private-key) encryption scheme as a pair of an encryption and a decryption algorithm (Enc, Dec). On security parameter n, the encryption algorithm Enc gets as input a key of length t(n) and a message of length m, and outputs a ciphertext of length (n, m). The decryption algorithm Dec, gets a key and a ciphertext and outputs the message. 4 Informally, an encryption scheme (Enc, Dec) is KDI-secure against a family of functions H ⊆ {h : {0, 1} t → {0, 1} * }, if no efficient adversary can distinguish between an oracle that correctly returns an encryption of h(k), given input h, and one that returns an encryption of the all zero string of the same length. Note that if H contains functions that map to constants, plain-text queries can be obtained as well. 
Definition 2.5 (KDI-security
(k, h(k)) [resp. Enc(k, 0 m(t) )] (
if the schemes is randomized, it returns a random encryption). We say that (Enc, Dec) is KDI-secure for a class of functions H, if
is negligible for every efficient algorithm A that only queries functions in H.
Cryptographic Games
For reductions that treat the family H of query-functions as black-box, we are able to prove a very strong impossibility result. In this case, we show that essentially no cryptographic assumption is sufficient to guarantee the KDI-security of the scheme. In order to do this, we first define the set of cryptographic assumptions we consider. 5 For the sake of readability, however, we will not try to be as general as possible here. Yet, as far as we can see our definition still captures all natural hardness assumptions.
Definition 2.6 (cryptographic games).
A cryptographic game is a (possibly inefficient) random system Γ that on security parameter n interacts with an attacker A and may output a special symbol win. In case Γ(1 n ) outputs this symbol in an interaction with A(1 n ), we say that
is negligible for all ppt A, where the probability is over the randomness of A and Γ.
Examples: One might define the security of a one-way function f by the following game. On security parameter n, the system Γ selects a random x ∈ {0, 1} n and sends y = f (x) to the adversary. Γ outputs win if A outputs x ∈ f −1 (y). To define the DDH hardness assumption one needs a bit more work.
6 On security parameter n, the system Γ expects first a sequence of at least n ones, we denote the actual number received by α. The system Γ then sends A a description of an appropriately chosen group g of order Ω(2 n ) and the generator g, as well as α randomly chosen triples (g
, where z i = x i y i or a uniform random element, each with probability 1 2 . The attacker A wins, if the number of instances where he incorrectly predicts whether z i was chosen independently of x i and y i , is at most α 2 − α 2/3 . Clearly, if Γ is secure, the usual DDH hardness assumption holds, since any algorithm that breaks the DDH assumption can be used for violating the security of Γ.
7 The reverse direction is implied by the main result (i.e., Theorem 1) of [IJK07] as follows. Assume the existence of a polynomial-time adversary A violating the security of Γ. Let ε(n) ∈ 1/ poly(n) be such that A's winning probability is more than ε(n) infinitely often and α <
Theorem 1] yields that the probability of A to be wrong on fewer than
, contradicting the existence of A.
Black-Box Reductions
A reduction from a primitive P to a primitive Q consists of showing that if there exists an implementation C of Q, then there exists an implementation M C of P . This is equivalent to showing that for every adversary that breaks M C , there exists an adversary that breaks C. Such a reduction is semi-black-box if it ignores the internal structure of Q's implementation, and it is fully-black-box (using the terminology of [RTV04] ) if 5 We remark that definitions of similar spirit to the one below were previously used in [DOP05, Hof08] . 6 The same argument can be applied for many other assumptions, but we refrain from formalizing this in order no to get bogged down in unrelated details.
7 Given an algorithm A that breaks that DDH assumption with advantage 1/p(n) for infinitely many n, we construct the following attacker A for Γ. As first message A sends 1 p(n) 3 to Γ, and then applies A for each of the triples it gets back from Γ.
it also has black-box proof of security. That is, the adversary for breaking Q ignores the internal structure of both Q's implementation and of the (alleged) adversary breaking P . The following definition expands the above general discussion for the case of a fully-black-box reduction of a KDI-secure encryption scheme from a one-way permutation. inverts the permutation with non-negligible probability.
When considering reductions from a KDI-secure cryptosystem, it is natural to consider whether the proof of security accesses the challenge functions also as a black box. We say that a proof of KDI-security of a cryptosystem is strongly-black-box, if it treats the challenge function also as a black-box. 
Extending KDI-secure Encryption Schemes
We would like to make sure our impossibility results hold even for encryption schemes that encrypt messages of length one bit. For technical reasons, however, we will actually need to encrypt messages of length 2t, where t is the key length. We therefore give a straightforward, but slightly tedious transformation that allows us to do that. (In fact, the following transformation does slightly more, in order to make the technical part in Sections 3 and 4 a bit easier.) 
8 Alternatively, given A Γ 's (partial) view, it is possible to (efficiently) list all the queries done to the challenge function during the execution.
9 Namely, H 1 is the set of functions with the property that every output bit is described by a function in H, after some appropriate padding of the input. We will assume that the security parameter σ of the given encryption scheme is at least the key length t. It is clear that t ≤ p(σ) for some polynomial p, and if σ < t, we simply redefine σ to be equal to t without changing the encryption scheme.
Proof. We assume without lost of generality that the security parameter σ of the given encryption scheme is at least the key length and start by building an encryption scheme (Enc 0
Having the above, we define (Enc 1 , Dec 1 ) as follows: given a message to encrypt of arbitrary length, we partition the message into bits and encrypt every bit using Enc 0 (for the same security parameter). In the decryption we do the same using Dec 0 . Additionally, if the security parameter σ of (Enc, Dec) is greater than the key length t, algorithm Enc 1 uses σ − t additional key bits that it ignores. All in all, (Enc 1 , Dec 1 ) has a deterministic encryption algorithm and is always correct. Clearly, (Enc 1 , Dec 1 ) satisfies conditions (a) and (b).
We now show that condition (c) is also satisfied by (Enc 1 , Dec 1 ): we construct an adversary A (·) for (Enc, Dec) given an adversary for (Enc 1 , Dec 1 ) as follows. Let A 1 be an adversary for (Enc 1 , Dec 1 ). The adversary A A 1 first picks t 1 − t additional key bits, and then emulates A 1 . Every time A 1 asks for an encryption of a function h ∈ H * , A A 1 decomposes h into its components h i ∈ H. If t 1 > t it computes the respective functions in H, and then obtains each of the encryptions from the given KDI-encryption oracle of (Enc, Dec). Note that this decomposition can be done in a black-box manner, by considering for each h i only the relevant part in the output of h. Then, A A 1 prefixes each answer with a 0 (to denote that the decryption is correct), adds uniformly chosen randomness for the decryption, concatenates the answers and returns the resulting ciphertext to A 1 . One checks that with high probability the distribution of the resulting ciphertext is as required. Once A 1 gives a prediction, A A1 outputs this prediction. Finally, we consider condition (f ). Let A (·) Γ be the adversary, guaranteed by the black-box proof of security of (Enc, Dec), that violates the security of Γ given an adversary for (Enc, Dec). It is clear that A
Γ is a black-box proof of security for (Enc 1 , Dec 1 ). Moreover, assuming that (Enc, Dec) has a strongly-black-box proof of security (and that A (·) Γ is the adversary guaranteed by this proof), it is easy to verify that A
Γ is a strongly-black-box proof of security for (Enc 1 , Dec 1 ).
From One-way Permutations
In this section we prove Theorem 1.1, but we only give the proof for the case of one-way permutations. The proof for (enhanced) family of trapdoor permutations follows immediately using standard techniques (cf., [GT00, HHRS07] ). Let (Enc (·) , Dec (·) ) be an encryption scheme with oracle access to a one-way permutation. By Proposition 2.9, we can assume that the encryption scheme is always correct, has a deterministic decryption algorithm, defined on messages of any polynomial length and has a security parameter t equal to it's key length. We let (t) be the length of an encryption of a message of length 2t. In order to prove Theorem 1.1, we use the following inefficient algorithm Breaker f,h . 
Breaker Violates the KDI-Security of the Scheme
The following adversary uses Breaker 
Input: Security parameter t.
Operation:
Step 1: Call Q(h t ) (or Q(h t )) to obtain an encryption c of h t (k) (or of 0 2t ).
Step 2: Call Breaker Step Proof. Algorithm A KDI only gives the wrong answer if the oracle is Q and Breaker does not return ⊥. Assume now that the oracle is Q. Then, for any fixed k and k we have
2 2t , and using the union bound we have that the for a fixed k the probability that Breaker does not return ⊥ is at most 2 −t . 10 Using an averaging argument, the probability that h t is such that something else but ⊥ is returned with probability higher than 2 −t/2 is at most 2 −t/2 . Since the h t ∈ h's are chosen independently from each other, the probability that there exists t 0 ∈ N for which A KDI breaks the scheme for no t > t 0 is zero. We conclude that with probability one over the random choice of h ∈ H, it holds that A KDI breaks the KDI-security of (Enc, Dec) infinitely often.
Breaker Does not Invert Random Permutations
We prove the following upper bound on the probability that an algorithm with access to Breaker inverts a random permutation. In the following let µ A (n) be an upper bound on number of π queries and the length of the maximal π query that A does on input y ∈ {0, 1} n (either directly or through the calls to Breaker Dec π ,h ), and let µ Dec (t) the same bound with respect to the π queries that Dec does on input (k, c) ∈ {0, 1} t × {0, 1} (t) . We assume without loss of generality that both upper bounds are monotonically increasing, that µ Dec (t) ≥ t + (t) and that µ A (n) ≥ n. We also assume that µ Dec (t) < 2 t .
Lemma 3.4. Let A be an adversary that gets h as an auxiliary input 11 and has oracle access to π and Breaker n it holds that
Dec (n) := min {t ∈ N : µ Dec (t) ≥ n}. Applying the Borel-Cantelli lemma on the above we get the following corollary. Dec π ,h ) h
In Appendix A, we give a proof of a non-uniform version of Lemma 3.4 (the adversary can use an arbitrary additional non-uniform advice) using the technique introduced by Gennaro and Trevisan [GT00] . Here, we use a different technique that is similar to the one used by Simon [Sim98] . The main idea is to study what happens if π is modified slightly by mapping a second, randomly chosen element to y (the element that A tries to invert). We show that such a change will likely go unnoticed by A(y), and it will not find the new preimage. After the change, however, both preimages of y are equally likely to be the original one, so A(y) could not have found the original one either.
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For a given function g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and two strings x * , y ∈ {0, 1} n , we define the function g |x * →y as
We assume that all calls to Dec π |x * →y are well defined. In particular, if Dec queries π |x * →y both at position π −1 (y) and at x * = π −1 (y) (and thus might act arbitrarily as it "notices" that π |x * →y is not a permutation), we assume it stops and outputs 0. We now wish to consider the elements {x * ∈ {0, 1} n } for which Breaker 
Definition 3.6 (Diff). For an oracle function Dec, an infinite sequence of functions h ∈ H, t ∈ N, and strings c ∈ {0, 1}
* and y ∈ {0, 1} n , we let
Note that for x * / ∈ Diff π (t, c, h, y), it holds that Breaker 
Proof. For t ∈ N, c ∈ {0, 1} * and k ∈ {0, 1} t , let D c,k be the set of all possible images of Dec π |x * →y (k, c), enumerating over all x * ∈ {0, 1} n (i.e., the set D c,k := {Dec π |x * →y (k, c) :
. 13 We first note that |D c,k | ≤ µ Dec (t) + 1 ≤ 2 t -in an execution of Dec π (k, c) at most µ Dec (t) elements x 1 , . . . , x µDec(t) are queried, and only if x * ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x µDec(t) } the image of Dec can be changed. Let H t be the t'th entry in H. Applying Lemma 2.3 with V = 2 t , s = t + (t), α = µ Dec (t) and letting B k = 1 iff h t (k) ∈ D c,k , we have that
We next show that
We prove Equation (2) by presenting an injective function φ from Diff
Let i x * denote the index (i.e., position) of the query π(x * ) among the π queries that Dec π (k x * , c) does, and let φ be the function that maps x * to (i x * , k x * ). Since a pair (i, k) specifies a single x (the one queried at i'th position in Dec π (k, c)), it follows that φ is indeed injective. We note that for t > µ −1 Dec (n), it always holds that x * / ∈ Diff π (t, c, h, y) (Dec cannot invoke π on such a long input). Combining (1) and (2), we have that with probability at least 1 − µ A (n)2
Dec (n) over the choice of h, for each of the at most µ A (n) queries Breaker(t, c) that A(y) does, it holds that |Diff(t, c, h,
For a given value of π and x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} n , let π |x0↔x1 := π |x0→π(x1),x1→π(x0) . We next show that with high probability, A(y) behaves exactly the same given the oracle π or π |x * ↔y . 
Proof. Let X π be all the queries to π in tr(π, h, y, r A ), clearly |X π | ≤ µ A (n). Let further X Diff be the union of the sets Diff π (t, c, h, y) for all calls (t, c) made by A to Breaker. If x * / ∈ X π ∪X Diff , we have that tr(π, h, y, r A ) = tr(π |x * →y , h, y, r A ) (cf., the remark after Definition 3.6). Claim 3.7 yields that with probability at least
2 . Hence, a union bound yields that
Finally, if tr(π, h, y, r A ) and tr(π |x * ↔π −1 (y) , h, y, r A ) are different, then one of tr(π, h, y, r A ) = tr(π |x * →y , h, y, r A ) or tr(π |x * →y , h, y, r A ) = tr(π |x * ↔π −1 (y) , h, y, r A ) must hold. Since π |x↔π −1 (y) is also a permutation, and x * is a uniformly chosen element given π |x * ↔π −1 (y) and y, Equation (3) states that both these events have probability at most p(n)/2.
We now use Claim 3.9 for proving Lemma 3.4.
Proof. (of Lemma 3.4) Assuming without lost of generality that A queries it's output, the probability that A (π,Breaker
Dec π ,h ) (y) h = π −1 (y) is at most the probability that the traces tr(π, h, y, r A ) and tr(π |x * ↔π −1 (y) , h, y, r A ) are different plus 2 −n (to handle the case x * = π −1 (y)). By Claim 3.9, the latter probability is at most 2 −n + p(n).
Putting it Together
We use the results from Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 for proving Theorem 1.1.
Proof. (of Theorem 1.1) Assume that there exists a black-box proof of security from breaking the KDIsecurity of (Enc π , Dec π ) using a poly-wise independent hash function to breaking the hardness of π, and let M (·) be the algorithm for inverting π as guaranteed by this proof of security. Lemma 3.3 yields that
breaks the KDI-security of (Enc π , Dec π ) with probability one over the choice of h. Thus,
needs to break the one-way property of π with probability one over the choice of h as well. However, since A π,B can be efficiently emulated by an algorithm A with oracle access to Breaker
Dec π ,h and π, and given h as an auxiliary input, Corollary 3.5 yields that with probability one over the choice of π and h, algorithm A π,B does not break the one-wayness of π, and a contradiction is derived.
From Arbitrary Assumptions
In this section, we rule out the existence of reductions with strongly-black-box proof of security from the KDI-security of an encryption scheme, to a very large class of hardness assumptions. That is, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (restatement of Theorem 1.2). There exists no reduction with strongly-black-box proof of security from the KDI-security of an encryption scheme to any cryptographic game.
Let (Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme. As in Section 3, we use Proposition 2.9 and assume without loss of generality that the encryption scheme is always correct, has deterministic decryption algorithm, is defined on messages of any length, and has security parameter t equal to the key length. We let (t) be the length of an encryption of a message of length 2t.
Consider an instantiation of Breaker (Algorithm 3.1) with f = Dec and h ∈ H = {H t } t∈N , where H t is the set of all possible function from {0, 1} t to {0, 1} 2t . As in Section 3, we have that there exists an efficient algorithm, with oracle access to Breaker Dec,h and h, that breaks the KDI-security of (Enc, Dec) with probability one over the choice of h ∈ H. The following Lemma states that in many settings, having oracle access to Breaker Dec,h does not yield any significant additional power. Proof. Algorithm A emulates A, using its random-coins as the random-coins of A, while remembering all query and answer pairs to h. When the emulated A queries Breaker Dec,h (t, c), algorithm A distinguishes between the following two cases:
Case 1: t < log(t A (n)) + log(1/δ(n)). A fully emulates Breaker Dec,h . Namely, A evaluates h t (k) for all k ∈ {0, 1} t and returns the first one for which Dec(k, c) = h t (k). It returns ⊥ if no such k exists.
Case 2: t ≥ log(t A (n)) + log(1/δ(n)). A checks all the previous queries to h of length t in lexicographic order. If for one of those queries it holds that Dec(k, c) = h t (k), it returns k, otherwise it returns ⊥. Dec,h finds a consistent key) is at most 2 − log(t A (n))−log(1/δ(n)) = δ(n)/t A (n). Since there are at most t A (n) calls to Breaker Dec,h , the probability that in any of those A returns a wrong value is at most δ(n), which proves the lemma.
We can now prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.1) The proof follows the lines of the one of Theorem 1.1, but we need to work a little harder for proving that having access to h does not give the adversary additional power.
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Assume that there exists a strongly-black-box proof of security from (Enc, Dec) to a cryptographic game Γ and let M (·) be the algorithm for breaking Γ as guaranteed by this proof of security. It easily follows from the proof of Lemma 3.3, that also in the setting of this section there exists an efficient algorithm A
Breaker
Dec,h ,h KDI
, with oracle access to Breaker
Dec,h and h, that breaks the KDI-security of (Enc, Dec) with probability one over the choice of h. It follows that M
A
Breaker Dec,h ,h KDI breaks the security of Γ with probability one over the choice of h. Namely,
where r A and r Γ denote the random-coins of A and Γ, respectively, and p h is some polynomial that may depend on h. In the following we first remove the dependence of the polynomial p h from h. For this let 14 One gets this property "for free", when the underlying hardness assumption is inverting a random permutation. 15 The σ-additivity of the measure implies that the event in the next probability is measurable.
Combining Equations (4) and (5) we get that 
which implies that there is a polynomial p(n) such that ε(n) > 1 p(n) infinitely often. In order to finish the proof, we would like now to apply Lemma 4.2 on M A Breaker Dec,h ,h KDI . Recall that Lemma 4.2 was proved only in the stand alone settings, where in particular no interaction with a random system is considered. Since the proof of security of (Enc, Dec) is strongly-black-box, we have that Γ does not access, through interaction with M (n) for infinitely many n's. Our final step is to emulate M h , where rather than accessing h we randomly chooses the answer of each time one is requested (and cache it). The latter emulation breaks the cryptographic assumption with probability at least 1 2p(n) for infinitely many n's and since it is also efficient, it implies that Γ is not secure.
Applying Our Technique to Other Primitives
It seems tempting to try and use the above Breaker also to show the impossibility of constructing other KDIsecure primitives. Consider for instance pseudorandom functions or permutations that are supposed to be secure even if the adversary can obtain its value on a function of its secret key. Halevi and Krawczyk [HK07] show that a deterministic construction cannot exist, but give a construction in case the permutation has an additional public parameter (i.e., salt) chosen after the challenge function is fixed. Their construction, however, compresses (e.g., maps n bits to n/2).
It is indeed possible to generalize our techniques to this case, as long for as the pseudorandom functions are injective for every key. In this case, Breaker finds a key k such that f k,r (h(k)) = c, where f is the pseudorandom function and r is the random salt. The reason this method fails if the construction compresses (as the one given by Halevi and Krawczyk [HK07] ), is that Breaker as defined above does not seem to give useful information about the key anymore, since it is unlikely that the correct key is the lexicographically smallest.
It seems that we also cannot utilize our Breaker for the general case of length increasing (non-injective) pseudorandom functions (or equivalently, for the case that we are allowed to make several KDI queries). Consider the question whether a given pseudorandom function is constant on a negligible fraction of the keys (e.g., on a single key k it holds that f k,r (·) := 0 ). Deciding whether a given function has this property or not might be infeasible. Yet, using for instance the Breaker of Section 4, we can easily find the right answer: ask the Breaker on (h, 0 ), where h is a random hash function, and answer "Yes" is the Breaker finds some consistent key. Thus, in this setting our Breaker gives us an extra power that we cannot emulate.
